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WHEN IS A STATE A STATE? THE CASE FOR 
RECOGNITION OF SOMALILAND 
Alison K. Eggers*
Abstract: It has been well over a decade since the world attempted to save 
Somalia from the dustbin of “failed states.” During that decade, one re-
gion of Somalia has pulled away from its post-colonial union with Soma-
lia, established its own government, kept the peace, and managed to 
ºourish in a kind of stability that is only a faint memory to most Somali-
ans outside the region. Somaliland, once a British colony, argues it should 
be recognized as an independent state. This Note explores the legal con-
ception of statehood, from the Montevideo Convention to the more re-
cent emphasis on self-determination, and then turns to the case of Soma-
liland, arguing that Somaliland should be recognized as a state by the 
international community. 
Introduction 
 There have been few state-speciªc success stories emanating from 
the Horn of Africa since the early 1990s. Somalia itself, once the focus 
of world-wide attention and aid, has lapsed into what many scholars call 
a “failed state.”1 Special attention is frequently drawn to the deligitimi-
zation of the state, uneven development, and lack of public services, 
including the lack of an effective security apparatus.2 One region of 
what the world recognizes as Somalia, a northwestern province called 
Somaliland, seems to be resisting the “failed state” fate of Somalia as a 
whole.3 After providing a brief overview on Somaliland’s claim to state-
hood, this note will discuss the international conception of statehood. 
The most frequently cited deªnition of a state, taken from the Monte-
                                                                                                                      
* Alison K. Eggers is the Editor in Chief of the Boston College International and Compara-
tive Law Review. 
1 Anonymous, The Failed State Index, Foreign Policy, July 1, 2005, available at http:// 
www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3098. Somalia comes out near the top of 
the list, number ªve, with special attention drawn to deligitimization of the state, uneven 
development, public services, security apparatus, and demographic pressures. 
2 See generally id. 
3 See, e.g., Somalilandgov.com, available at http://www.somalilandgov.com (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2006); see also Somaliland.Org, available at http://www.somaliland.org (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2006) (archiving news and opinion pieces describing the development of Somali-
land, particularly its civil society). 
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video Convention, serves as a starting point.4 After discussing the legal 
conception of statehood, the Note turns to the case of Somaliland and 
analyzes what prerequisites for statehood Somaliland meets or fails to 
achieve.5 The Note argues that Somaliland, which has operated as a 
self-sustaining state since it declared independence in 1991, should be 
recognized as such by the international community.6 The analysis leads 
to several conclusions, notably that the alarm with which the nation-
state system views breakaway states is both unnecessary and counter-
productive to the peaceful conduct of world affairs. 
I. Background and History 
 The Republic of Somaliland is located on the eastern Horn of Af-
rica and occupies the same land colonized by the British prior to 1960.7 
Upon independence, in June 1960, Somaliland became the ªrst Somali 
country recognized by the U.N.8 A week later, in early July 1960, Soma-
liland joined with Somalia Italiana to form one state with the seat of 
government in Mogadishu.9 Somalia had no history as a stable state 
prior to its colonial rule, but Somaliland did, thanks in part to a sig-
niªcant trade axis centered in its territory.10 Shortly after undertaking 
the union of the two states, Somalilanders voted against the union in a 
uniªcation referendum.11 In May 1991, following decades of attacks led 
by the Said Barre regime and during extensive famine (which brought 
                                                                                                                      
4 The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 
L.N.T.S. 19 (1933) [hereinafter Montevideo Convention]. In recent years, scholars have 
criticized the deªnition, arguing it is both under- and over-inclusive and lacks analytical 
room for developments over the past few decades, such as rising concerns regarding self-
determination. See Thomas D. Grant, Deªning Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and Its 
Discontents, 37 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 403, 435, 437, 449 (1999). 
5 See generally Montevideo Convention, supra note 4. 
6 See Martin Doornbos, Somalia: Alternative Scenarios for Political Reconstruction, 101 Afr. 
Aff. 93, 95 (2002). 
7 Günther Schlee, Redrawing the Map of the Horn: The Politics of Difference, 73 Afr. 343, 
348 (2003); see Doornbos, supra note 6, at 95. 
8 The Republic of Somaliland, Somaliland: An African Success Story, http://www.somali- 
landgov.com/G8Somaliland.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2006) [hereinafter African Success 
Story]. 
9 See id.; Somalilandgov.com, Country Proªle, supra note 3 (contains basic country pro-
ªle, including history of relationship with Somalia). 
10 Ismail I. Ahmed & Reginald Herbold Green, The Heritage of War and State Collapse in 
Somalia and Somaliland: Local-Level Effects, External Interventions and Reconstruction, 20 Third 
World Q. 113, 113 (1999). 
11 See id. at 116; see also Farhiya Ali Ahmed, Somaliland Elusive Independence, New Afri-
can, Jan. 1, 2006, at 34. 
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U.N. efforts and U.S. forces to Somalia),12 Somaliland withdrew from 
its union with Somalia and moved its state capitol back to Hargeisa.13
 A series of grassroots reconciliation conferences have been held by 
Somaliland’s elders since 1992 to resolve outstanding community con-
ºicts across the territory.14 Somaliland’s population of 3.5 million, scat-
tered across an estimated area of 137,600 square kilometers, is repre-
sented by men (and, as “clan ambassadors,” women) chosen by virtue 
of personal attributes such as fairness and wisdom, not merely age.15 
Over the past decade and a half Somaliland has repatriated refugees, 
rebuilt war-torn infrastructure, and demobilized rival militias.16 Despite 
the marked decline in inter-clan tension, the re-establishment of trust 
between communities, and its overall success in pursuing stability and 
security for its population, Somaliland’s pleas for recognition have fallen 
on deaf ears.17
 Ethiopia has gone the furthest of all states in its unofªcial recogni-
tion of Somaliland by entering into bilateral agreements for coopera-
tion in various arenas.18 Yemen has also engaged in increasingly warm 
relations with Somaliland, largely for inter-regional political reasons.19 
Despite formal ministerial-level meetings between Somaliland and its 
former colonial ruler, the United Kingdom has resisted calls to recog-
                                                                                                                      
12 The U.S. intervention and on-going U.N. involvement in Somalia raise a variety of 
complicated issues of international law, foreign affairs, and humanitarian considerations 
which are not addressed in this Note. For an analysis of forcible intervention, see generally 
T. Modibo Ocran, The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of Robust Peacekeeping, 25 
B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 1 (2002). 
13 See Ahmed & Green, supra note 10, at 113, 119–21; see Somaliland.Org, supra note 3. 
Life was brutal for Somalilanders under the Barre regime. See generally Alex McBride, Wel-
come to Somaliland, New African, Aug. 1, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 1446713. 
14 See Ahmed & Green, supra note 10, at 123. 
15 See id.; Somaliland.Org, Map of Somaliland, supra note 3, available at http://www. 
somaliland.org/somaliland.asp (last visited Dec. 3, 2006). 
16 See Stefan Simanowitz, Democracy Comes of Age in Somaliland, 287 Contemp. Rev. 335, 
336 (2005). Simanowitz also notes that Somaliland “now boasts modern airports, hospitals, 
ports, power plants and universities. There is a free press and the central bank manages an 
ofªcial currency with relatively stable exchange rates. An unarmed police force and inde-
pendent judiciary maintain order.” Id. 
17 See Doornbos, supra note 6, at 106; Ahmed & Green, supra note 10, at 124. Dan 
Simpson, former U.S. ambassador and special envoy to Somalia, agreed, at the time, that 
Sonaliland was a part of Somalia and should not be recognized as an independent state. 
He has since changed his mind, especially now that disputes over borders and control of 
the government have long been resolved. See Dan Simpson, The Ghost of Somalia: Somaliland 
Should Be Allowed to Depart a Chaotic Country in Transition, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, July 
12, 2006, at B7. 
18 See Doornbos, supra note 6, at 105. 
19 See id. 
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nize Somaliland’s independence.20 Both the United States and the 
United Kingdom regard the issue of recognition as a matter for the Af-
rican Union, to which Somaliland applied for membership in Decem-
ber 2005.21
II. Statehood and the Inviolability of Borders 
 The Montevideo Convention lists four basic elements required for 
statehood: (1) a permanent population; (2) a deªned territory; (3) gov-
ernment; and (4) capacity to enter into relations with other states.22 
This deªnition is so oft-repeated that it is duplicated, nearly verbatim, 
in dozens of of cases, treaties, and tomes.23 The Convention also states 
that although the “political existence of the state is independent of rec-
ognition by the other states,” such recognition may be explicit or 
tacit.24
 The United States has been fairly consistent in its application of 
the Montevideo standard.25 In Kadic v. Karadzic, the Second Circuit was 
presented with the question of whether a self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb 
republic within Bosnia-Herzegovina, referred to as Sprska, was a state 
whose leadership could be held to account for various atrocities com-
mitted by the proclaimed leaders.26 The court summarized its conclu-
sion that Srpska met the deªnition of a state by noting that it “is alleged 
to control deªned territory, control populations within its power, and 
to have entered into agreements with other governments. It has a 
president, a legislature, and its own currency. These circumstances 
readily appear to satisfy the criteria for a state in all respects of interna-
tional law.”27 Sprska, by virtue of its state-like characteristics, was indeed 
a de facto state entitled to the rights and encumbered by the responsi-
bilities of a state within the international system.28 This decision was 
                                                                                                                      
20 Press Release, Republic of Somaliland, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (May 20, 2005), 
available at http://www.somalilandgov.com/Edna1.htm [hereinafter Press Release]; see 
Doornbos, supra note 6, at 106. 
21 David White, Somaliland Seeks US help in Battle for Recognition, Fin. Times UK, Aug. 24, 
2006, at 8. 
22 Montevideo Convention, supra note 4, art. 1. 
23 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
§ 201 (1987). 
24 Montevideo Convention, supra note 4, arts. 3, 7; see also Restatement (Third) of 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 202 cmt. b (1987) 
25 See, e.g., Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1991); Nat’l 
Petrochemical Co. v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 1988). 
26 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236–37 (2d Cir. 1995). 
27 See id. at 245. 
28 See id. 
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hardly a stretch for the Circuit court, as the Supreme Court has long 
recognized that “any government, however violent and wrongful in its 
origin, must be considered a de facto government if it was in the full and 
actual exercise of sovereignty over a territory and people large enough 
for a nation . . . .”29
 Although some deªnitions of statehood require the capacity to 
engage in formal relations with other states, they rarely require recog-
nition by other states.30 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 
succinctly points out that “[a]n entity that satisªes the requirements of 
[the] § 201 [deªnition of a state] is a state whether or not its statehood 
is formally recognized by other states.”31
 International law appears to emphasize the importance of the 
territorial integrity of states. Generally, the preference is to rely on 
internal domestic laws of existing states to adjudicate the succession 
and establishment of new states.32
 Many states and international bodies view the disposition of na-
tional territory as a question for the sovereign state to decide: “Positive 
International Law does not recognize the right of national groups, as 
such, to separate themselves from the State of which they form a part 
by the simple expression of a wish, any more than it recognizes the 
right of other States to claim such a separation.”33 Individual states have 
echoed this belief, noting that “international law does not speciªcally 
grant component parts of sovereign states the legal right to secede uni-
laterally from their ‘parent’ state.”34
 The dogged reliance on the inviolability of borders and inherent 
worth of territorial integrity, however, has its fair share of detractors.35 
One such scholar, Thomas M. Franck, argues it is incorrect to assert 
that international law has always favored the territorial integrity of 
states, pointing out that the “entire history of the dismantling of the 
                                                                                                                      
29 See Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S. 594, 620 (1878). 
30 See e.g. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
§ 202 cmt. b (1987). 
31 See id. 
32 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (considered the touchtone of the U.N., art. 2, para. 4 
states that “all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State”); Report on 
the International Committee of Jurists on the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question, League 
of Nations O.J., Special Supp. No. 3(1920), reprinted in International Law: Cases and 
Commentary 439 (Mark W. Janis & John E. Noyes eds., 2001) [hereinafter Aaland Islands 
Report]. 
33 See Aaland Islands Report, supra note 32, at 439. 
34 Reference Re Succession of Quebec, 37 I.L.M. 1340, 1368 (Can. 1998). 
35 See generally Doornbos, supra note 6; Ahmed & Green, supra note 10. 
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German, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian empires after 1918 
reveals a bias of international preference toward a right of nationalities 
to assert their preference in determining [their ªnal arrangements of 
statehood].”36 In light of the great period of decolonization, whose ter-
ritorial break-ups and reconªgurations worldwide assisted one billion 
people in seceding from the remaining empires, Franck ªnds it “ab-
surd” to maintain international law has always favored the territorial 
integrity of states.37
 Franck feels that even a careful reading of the Declaration on 
Friendly Relations reveals that it contains no absolute bias toward ter-
ritorial integrity, but restates well-known rules, namely, “(1) that states 
shall not dismember other states (i.e. use force unlawfully) under the 
pretext of aiding self-determination; and (2) the international law 
and its system is neutral as to secessionist movements (i.e., does not 
‘authorize or encourage’ those) that seek the break-up of established 
sovereign states.”38 Franck’s argument, perfectly applicable to the case 
of Somaliland, boils down to the stark reality that while international 
law neither prohibits nor encourages secession outside the particular 
colonial experience, it will recognize secession when it is successful.39
 And so while international law does not recognize a right of seces-
sion outside such a context, this alone does not mean that international 
law prohibits secession.40 What international law clearly does prohibit is 
the encroachment of other states onto the territory of their neighbors, 
a violation of the generally accepted principles requiring states to re-
spect the integrity of other states.41 This principle, however, does not 
apply within the state: 
Thus, unless a secession is controlled from outside or is car-
ried out by elements that either come from outside or seek to 
establish a state based on denial of the right of self-determ-
ination of the majority or a part of the population, the fact 
                                                                                                                      
36 See Thomas M. Franck, Opinion Directed at Question 2 of the Reference, in Self-
determination in International Law: Quebec and Lessons Learned 75, 82 (Anne 
Bayefsky ed., 2000) (Franck points to the examples of Poland (pursuit of national inde-
pendence), Schleswig and Saar (the choice to join an adjoining cohort state) and Yugosla-
via, Czechoslovakia and Silesia (the choice to remain part of a multi-ethnic state)). 
37 See id. 
38 Id. at 84. 
39 See id. 
40 George Abi-Saab, The Effectivity Required of an Entity That Declares Its Independence in 
Order for It to Be Considered a State in International Law, in Self-determination in Interna-
tional Law, supra note 36, at 69, 72. 
41 See id. at 72–73. 
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that the process of creation of the new state can be character-
ized as secession does not affect or in any way inºuence its le-
gal existence from the standpoint of international law, once 
the primary fact—i.e., its effectivity as a state—has material-
ized.42
 For a newly-formed state, which meets the basic elements of state-
hood (population, territory, government, and the capacity for rela-
tions) in an international system that does not forbid secession, contin-
ued reliance on the inviolability of state borders also breeds a certain 
amount of tension with the right of peoples to self-determination, now 
considered a basic principle of international law.43 The bind in which 
states like Somaliland ªnd themselves is neatly summarized by the duel-
ing notions of self-determination and territorial integrity found in one 
section of the U.N. General Assembly’s Declaration on the Occasion of 
the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations.44 The section provides 
that member states will “[c]ontinue to reafªrm the right of self-determ-
ination of all peoples” but that recognition of the “inalienable right of 
self determination . . . shall not be construed as authorizing or encour-
aging any action that would dismember or impair . . . the territorial in-
tegrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States . . . .”45
III. The Independent Nation-State of Somaliland 
 As international law expects that the right to self-determination be 
exercised within the framework of existing sovereign states, Somaliland 
ªnds itself at an impasse, because it lacks an effective parent state from 
which to apply for secession.46 With no coherent “parent” state with 
which to negotiate its independence, international law and the nation-
state system leave Somaliland with little alternative but to declare its 
independence and begin to act as an independent state, which it has 
done.47 The territory of Somaliland easily meets the criteria set forth by 
the Montevideo Convention.48 Somaliland has a permanent population 
                                                                                                                      
42 Id. at 73. 
43 See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; see also Antonio Cassese, Self-
Determination of Peoples: a Legal Reappraisal 171–72 (1995). 
44 G.A. Res. 50/6, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/6 (Oct. 24, 1995). 
45 Id. 
46 See Aaland Islands Report, supra note 32, at 439. 
47 See id. 
48 See Montevideo Convention, supra note 4. 
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estimated at 3.5 million which reafªrmed its support for sovereignty in 
a 2001 Constitutional Referendum.49 A decade after its initial declara-
tion of independence another referendum showed ninety-seven per-
cent of the population in favor of independence.50 Somaliland also has 
clearly deªned territory dating back to the colonial era when it was 
known as British Somaliland.51 The country is bordered by the Red Sea 
and the Gulf of Aden to the north, Puntaland to the east, Ethiopia to 
the west, and Djibouti to the northwest.52 When leaders of the Punta-
land region of Somalia “sold” oil leases in Somaliland waters to foreign 
investors, the Somaliland government took steps to ensure its sovereign 
waters would not be claimed by Puntland, thus defending its territorial 
integrity and sovereign waters.53 Tacitly recognizing these borders, 
land-locked Ethiopia recently signed a long-term use agreement with 
Somaliland for use of its Port of Berbera.54
 Somaliland also has a clearly deªned government and governance 
structure which relies heavily on community-based leadership, includ-
ing highly effective councils of elders.55 Its constitution calls for separa-
tion of powers among the branches of government and serves as the 
basic law of the land.56 In December 2002, Somaliland held its ªrst lo-
cal government elections, followed by a presidential election the follow-
ing spring.57 The presidential election was closer than the one in which 
George W. Bush beat Al Gore; the courts declared current President 
Kahin the victor, and the population and the candidates, accepted the 
decision.58 The results of parliamentary elections held in October 2005 
were accepted and endorsed by all three major political parties.59
 At ªrst glance, it appears Somaliland might struggle to meet the 
fourth criteria, the capacity to enter into relations with other states.60 
                                                                                                                      
49 African Success Story, supra note 8; see Somaliland.Org, supra note 3. 
50 Marc Lacey, The Signs Say Somaliland, But the World Says Somalia, N.Y. Times, June 5, 
2006,at A4. 
51 See African Success Story, supra note 8; Somaliland.Org, supra note 3. 
52 Fred Oluoch, Breakaway State Has Achieved Peace, Stability, Democracy, East African 
(Kenya), Feb. 28, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 3454803. 
53 Dilemma of the Horn: the West Pushes for Somaliland Recognition, 34 Def. & Foreign Aff. 
Strategic Pol’y 7 (2006) [hereinafter Dilemma of the Horn]. 
54 See African Success Story, supra note 8; Somaliland.Org, supra note 3. 
55 See Ahmed & Green, supra note 10, at 123. 
56 Oluoch, supra note 52. 
57 African Success Story, supra note 8. 
58 Lacey, supra note 50, at A4. 
59 Somaliland Ofªcial Website, Somaliland Parliamentary Election Results Announced, Oct. 
15, 2005, http://www.somalilandgov.com. 
60 See Montevideo Convention, supra note 4, art. 1. 
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This impression is incorrect.61 First, while no other state has estab-
lished formal diplomatic ties with Somaliland, it is quite clear that 
Somaliland has the capacity to do so.62 Somaliland’s elected govern-
ment is in consolidated control of the state; there are no rival parties 
or factions which challenge its claim to be the international “voice” of 
Somaliland’s people the way clan factionalism has splintered control 
of Somalia itself.63 Elected and appointed ofªcials inhabit ofªces such 
as the Presidency to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and 
Finance.64 Somaliland clearly meets the minimum standard of inter-
national law in that it has the capacity to engage in diplomatic rela-
tions, a mark of statehood.65
 Second, in addition to having the capacity to maintain foreign re-
lations, Somaliland routinely engages in “state-like” behavior, such as 
negotiating agreements with other states.66 Somaliland has been re-
ceived by ministers and governmental representatives in foreign states, 
including the United Kingdom and the United States.67 In June 2006 
Somaliland President Dahir Riyale Kahin visited ªve African states, 
Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Rwanda, and Uganda, pressing his case for 
independence.68 In September 2006, President Kahin met Ethiopian 
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi on his way back to Somaliland from a 
working visit in the United Kingdom and Germany.69 While maintain-
ing that its diplomatic overtures do not constitute recognition of Soma-
liland, Ethiopia has recently opened an embassy there.70
 Equally persuasive, and consistent with Franck’s contention that 
successful secession is clearly permissible under international law, is 
                                                                                                                      
61 See discussion infra pp. 218--19. 
62 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
§ 201 (1987); Schlee, supra note 7, at 348. 
63 See Schlee, supra note 7, at 348. 
64 See Press Release, supra note 20; Somaliland Ofªcial Website, Government, http:// 
www.somalilandgov.com (last visited Dec. 3, 2006). 
65 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
§ 201 (1987). 
66 See Doornbos, supra note 6, at 105. 
67 See Press Release, supra note 20; Somaliland Ofªcial Website, Somaliland Delegation 
Meets with State Department Ofªcials in Washington, July 1, 2005, http://www.somalilandgov. 
com. 
68 Joe De Capua, Somaliland President Visits Five African Nations, U.S. Fed. News, June 
16, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 1049835. 
69 Ethiopia, Other IGAD Members to Redouble Efforts to Realize Stable Transitional Government 
in Somalia, U.S. Fed. News, Sept. 8, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 15610123. 
70 See Jeninne Lee-St. John, Six Places with Separatist Anxiety, TIME, June 5, 2006, at 16; 
Ashenaª Abedje, VOA News: Ethiopia Says Its Trade Ties To Somaliland Do Not Signal Recogni-
tion, U.S. Fed. News, Feb. 3, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 11858397. 
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the fact that Somaliland “is by no means the ªrst African state to have 
entered into a voluntary union with another state and subsequently 
withdrawn from that union intact.”71 Egypt and Syria, Cape Verde and 
Guinea Bissau, Senegal and Mali, and Senegal and Gambia have all 
taken similar steps in their histories, with no effect on the status of 
their independence.72
 The duration of Somaliland’s de facto independence should also 
quell the international community’s fears that recognizing Somali-
land will spark a round of secessionist movements around the world.73 
Recognition of Somaliland fourteen years after it declared its inde-
pendence, during which time it stabilized its internal political strife 
and began successfully rebuilding community services and civil soci-
ety, sets the bar high enough that few states will attempt to follow its 
path.74 The African Union’s fact-ªnding mission agreed when it de-
clared that Somaliland’s status was “‘unique and self-justiªed in Afri-
can political history,’ and that ‘the case should not be linked to the 
notion of ‘opening a Pandora’s box.’”75
 Finally, recent events in Somalia make an excellent case for rec-
ognition of Somaliland as part of a larger international goal of stabil-
ity and harmony.76 In early August 2006, Somalia’s President Abdul-
lahi Yusuf announced the dismissal of Somalia’s ofªcial government.77 
By mid-August, the Union of Islamic Courts, promising to restore na-
tional unity under sharia law, captured Mogadishu.78 In response to 
growing chaos and tension, Ethiopia dispatched troops to Baidoa, 
temporary seat of the TFG, and Eritrea sent arms to the Islamists.79 
                                                                                                                      
71 African Success Story, supra note 8; see Franck, supra note 36, at 84. 
72 See African Success Story, supra note 8; Dilemma of the Horn, supra note 53, at 8. 
73 See Doornbos, supra note 6, at 106. Doornbos writes that despite “all their various 
differences, the clubs of states, especially the [Organization of African Unity], the [Euro-
pean Union] and the UN, tend to share a members only vision, from which they can see 
the globe only as divided up into formally independent states that are recognized as mem-
bers.” Id. 
74 See Ahmed & Green, supra note 10, at 125–26 (concluding that Somaliland’s “phoe-
nix-like” emergence was so successful it should provide insights to the international aid 
community); Lacey, supra note 50, at A4. 
75 Lacey, supra note 50, at A4. 
76 See David Blair, Somalia Breeds a New Threat to Us All, Daily Telegraph (U.K.), Aug. 
8, 2006, at 16. 
77 Id; World News in Brief: President Sacks Somali Cabinet, Indep. (London), Aug. 8, 2006, 
at 29. 
78 Simon Scott Plummer, A Forgotten Democracy in the Horn of Africa, Daily Telegraph 
(U.K.), Aug. 16, 2006, at 15. 
79 These developments are merely new plays in a long-running border war between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea. See id. 
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With the help of Ethiopian troops, the TFG succeeded in taking con-
trol of the capital of Mogadishu in January 2007, but has been under 
constant attack from remnants of the Union of Islamic Courts; Somali 
refugees see little point in returning home and news about the “re-
turn of violence, lawlessness and questionable moves by the U.S.- and 
Ethiopian-backed transitional government in Mogadishu conªrms 
fears” about life in Somalia.80 Some observers note it is difªcult to say 
whether Somalia is “slipping back into anarchy or limping toward re-
formed statehood,” but the signs are not promising.81
 Concern in Somaliland over the threat of terrorism, exacerbated 
by porous borders, has been heightened by terrorism’s prominent rise 
in Somalia and nascent beginnings in Somaliland.82 While extremists 
have murdered four foreign aid workers in Somaliland over the past 
few years, Somaliland’s criminal justice system has taken an active role 
in ferreting out and punishing terrorists.83 For example, in 2005 four 
men were sentenced to death for the murder of a British couple in 
2003.84 As undesirable as the problem is, it also presents an opportu-
nity for Somaliland in terms of its strategic importance to the West.85 
Somaliland leaders say they are “well placed to lend crucial support to 
Somalia’s U.N.-backed transitional government and strengthen co-
operation against international terrorism.”86 The “enduring lesson” of 
post-Soviet Afghanistan in 1989— “that power vacuums are always a 
magnet for terrorism” —implies that a stable ally in an otherwise pre-
carious neighborhood might be a welcome development for states the 
world over.87
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Conclusion 
 The question of whether Somaliland should be recognized as an 
independent state is hindered only by the blind adherence by the in-
ternational community to the nation-state system’s inviolability of bor-
ders. While the nation-state system has legitimate cause for concern, as 
it seems nearly every corner of the world has a population agitating for 
independence, the case of Somaliland poses no threat to international 
order or peace. Somalia may be making progress toward stability, but it 
has a great deal of work ahead before it will enjoy the relative security 
and prosperity of Somaliland. Expecting Somaliland to “wait and see” 
pins its future on Somalia’s ability to re-build and re-stabilize, the very 
unpredictable characteristics that fueled its quest for independence in 
the ªrst place. Somaliland has operated as an independent state for 
ªfteen years and as it meets international legal standards for “state-
hood” is, in fact, a state. What Somaliland lacks is formal recognition of 
its statehood by other states, a simple act which would enable it to take 
its place on the world stage and provide a commendable example for 
other states faced with internal strife and turmoil. 
